The Final End of Creation and the Moral Proof of the Existence of God
— A Study of Immanuel Kant’s
Critique of the Power of Judgment—

Kiyoshi HIMO *

Abstract

As is well-known, Kant proposed in Critique of Pure Reason (1781) three questions that should guide him in the development of his critical philosophy: ‘What can I know?’, ‘What should I do?’ and ‘What may I hope?’ And he was convinced that he had given in Critique of Pure Reason to the first question and in Critique of Practical Reason (1788) to the third as well as the second question a complete answer. Yet, he could not stay in his conviction. That is testified by his letter to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin on May 4, 1793, in which he tells that he could give only in the new published book, Religion within the boundaries of mere Reason, a complete answer to the third question. This leads us to notice the importance of Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). We can reasonably suppose that Kant supplemented in that work his answer to the first question and consequently saw the necessity of reinforcing his answer to the third question. I interpret Critique of the Power of Judgment from this perspective. First, I argue that the reflective judgment is the clue to the exposition of Kant’s revision of his own answers. In my opinion, Kant explicates that the reflective power of judgment in its teleological use opens up vistas on a worldview that looks out at the world as a systematic, harmonious whole at the top of which humankind, as ‘the final end of creation’, stands. Based on this, he establishes then ‘ethicotheology’, validating the moral proof of God. It is now acknowledged as belonging to our reasonable hopes that God as the creator of the moral world exists and as the moral legislator rules the world. And the important corollary is drawn from here: the establishment of a moral community of humankind under the dominion and protection of God. He will elaborate on this subject in his next work: Religion within the boundaries of mere Reason.

Keywords: reflective judgment, final end of creation, moral proof, ethicotheology, humankind

* Professor, Western Philosophy
Preface

In my previous articles I considered the development of Kant’s critical philosophy as his performance of solving the three questions that he proposed in the last part of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). And I argued that his solution was revised and supplemented after the publication of *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). I documented my argument by comparing the passage from *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant first proposed his three questions\(^1\), with his letter to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, on May 4, 1793, in which he mentioned again the same questions\(^2\).

At the time, when he wrote up *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant was convinced that he had given a complete answer to the first question: ‘What can I know?’, since he had already “exhausted all possible replies to it”. And he was evidently planning to write *Moral Philosophy* within several years in order to give an answer to the second question: ‘What should I do?’ As to the third question ‘What may I hope?’ he seemingly expected that its solution would follow closely that of the second question, since the question should be precisely led through the antecedent: ‘If I do what I should’. In fact, Kant had *Critique of Practical Reason* published seven years later. In that book we find his solution of the third as well as the second question. In “Analytic of pure practical reason”, namely, he states that to receive the universal form of the moral law into our maxim is just what we should do, which we also call the morality of our act. And in “Dialectic of pure practical reason” he states that we may hope the immortality of our soul as the necessary condition of our moral improvement and the existence of God as the fair distributor of happiness proportionally to one’s moral accomplishment. Thus we can recognize that Kant was convinced that he had given a complete answer to all the three questions in proper order.

Yet obviously Kant could not stay in this conviction. Five years after the publication of *Critique of Practical Reason* he wrote to his friend that he had tried to complete the third part of his plan (i.e. the solution of the third question) with his newly published work, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*\(^3\). It sounds as if the time had come at last for him to give an answer to the third question. So we cannot but be surprised at this letter. What made him abandon his previous conviction? Had his plan of constructing critical philosophy to be revised in the meantime?

In considering accurately these problems, I was interested in the important position of *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790) within the development of Kant’s critical philosophy. Probably he became aware that in spite of his previous assertion he had not yet exhausted all possible replies to the first
question: ‘What can I know?’ and conceded the necessity of making up for the insufficiencies. So we should regard *Critique of the Power of Judgment* in the first place as the supplementary work to the solution of the first question. It revealed a broader region of knowledge than *Critique of Pure Reason* had done and caused the subsequent reform. Certainly, there was no need for him to revise the answer to the second question: ‘What should I do?’ since it was merely of practical concern. But the answer to the third question: ‘What may I hope, if I do what I should?’, which is “simultaneously practical and theoretical”, was necessarily influenced by the successfully supplemented answer to the first question. Insofar as Kant admitted that we can know more, his answer to the third question had to be also enriched. So, in the latter half of *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, he tries to open up new vistas on the solution of the third question. This attempt will be completed in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.

In this paper I try to explicate this important progress of Kant’s critical philosophy through the interpretation of *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. The points of my arguments are as follows:

1. The power of judgment as a faculty of the mind can only be featured as a subject matter in the critical philosophy, insofar as its function is recognized to be based on its own peculiar *a priori* principles. The reflective judgment is that through which the power of judgment proves itself as an *a priori* legislative faculty with its autonomous principles. So we can characterize *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as the work that treats the reflective power of judgment (or more precisely: the power of judgment in its reflective use) as the subject. The reflective judgment is divided into two main types: the aesthetic judgment and the teleological judgment.

2. The power of judgment in its teleological use pertains to the external as well as the internal causal nexuses of the things and finds everywhere the purposiveness of the things related to each other. Consequently it opens up vistas on a worldview that looks out the world as a systematic, harmonious whole. The being that stands at the top of that world is called ‘the final end of creation’. It is nothing other than ‘the human being under moral laws’.

3. Our reason can infer from the concept of the final end of creation the existence of a moral being as the author of the world. That is the moral proof of God. The argumentation is only of practical validity, because the moral conduct is the performance requisite to us as the final end of creation. So God is characterized not only as the author, but also as the ruler of the moral world. Moreover, we can recognize from Kant’s statement without difficulty that ‘the final end of creation’ is a collective concept. He signifies with it not an individual human being, but human kind as a whole.
So the state becoming to the final end of creation means a universal community in which all human beings serve each other in order to improve themselves in morality. Thus *Critique of the Power of Judgment* opens up new vistas on the moral community of human kind. We can justly comment that Kant now states: ‘I may hope the full-scale realization of a moral community of human kind, if I do what I should (i.e. act morally)’. He leaves the elaboration of this hope to his next work. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* will perform the task a few years later.

1. The power of judgment as an *a priori* legislative faculty

In the Introduction to *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant mentions three faculties of the human mind and presents at the end the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All the faculties of the mind</th>
<th>Faculty of cognition</th>
<th><em>A priori</em> principles</th>
<th>Application to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of cognition</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Lawfulness</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of pleasure and displeasure</td>
<td>Power of judgment</td>
<td>Purposiveness</td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of desire</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Final end</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to him, all the three faculties are considered as ‘higher’ faculties, because they contain autonomy; the understanding contains the principles *a priori* for the faculty of cognition, the power of judgment for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and reason for the faculty of desire, respectively. However, this trichotomy must somewhat perplex us, when we recall what Kant stated in *Critique of Pure Reason*. He mentioned there as the main faculties pertaining to the human cognition the sensibility, the understanding and reason, of which the latter two were regarded as belonging to ‘higher’ faculties. As he was convinced that this division enabled him to exhaust all possible replies to the question: ‘What can I know?’, we could hardly expect from the context of *Critique of Pure Reason* that some other faculty would be featured in near future as the subject of another work of Critique.

Certainly, we don’t say that Kant omitted the power of judgment from his list of the faculties in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In Book II of ‘Transcendental analytic’, the part which explicates the pure concepts of the understanding, he enumerates the understanding, the power of judgment and reason as the higher faculties of cognition. And he attempts to give a transcendental doctrine for the power of judgment. Yet in fact, he argues there in behalf of the understanding; namely he elaborates on the conditions for the
application of the pure conception of the understanding to the manifold things of the sensibility. In order to make the cognition, the former must be applied to the latter. For the sake of that the understanding contains the principles \textit{a priori} and the sensibility provides the schemes for the coincidence with the pure concepts of the understanding. Under these instructions from both sides, the power of judgment functions just as the intermediary. It is regarded as having no principles \textit{a priori} peculiar to it. Thus in \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant assigned only a subordinate position to the power of judgment. It could not rank among the main faculties of cognition.

Yet nevertheless, Kant writes now \textit{Critique of the Power of Judgment}. He counts the power of judgment among the higher faculties that contain autonomy. Obviously, he discovered that the power of judgment contains also the principles \textit{a priori} peculiar to it. Which principles are meant, then? In order to answer this question, we should direct our attention to the distinction Kant draws between the determining and the reflective judgment. He introduces the distinction as follows:

The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even when, as a transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions \textit{a priori} in accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal), is \textbf{determining}. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely \textbf{reflecting}.\textsuperscript{5)}

Insofar as we can interpret the fundamental form of the judgment: ‘S is P’ primarily as ‘the particular is the universal’, his argument is convincing. The faculty of judgment in general is explained as the faculty of subsuming the particular under the universal, that is to say, of thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal is definitely given, the power of judgment can determinately subsume the particular under it. This judgment is justly called ‘determining judgment’. But Kant acknowledges here that the power of judgment can also form another kind of judgment, if the universal is not definitely given. In this case it assumes the universal and regards the particular as subsumed under that. This operation is ‘reflection’ and the judgment in form of ‘S is P’, which is brought forth by it, is properly called ‘the reflective judgment’.

In the determining judgment the power of judgment does not act autonomously, because the universal (the concept, the rule, the principle, the law etc.) is provided by the understanding or reason. As Kant
stated it in *Critique of Pure Reason*, the understanding contains its pure concepts as principles *a priori* and gives to the power of judgment instructions to apply them to the manifold things in the sensibility. In compliance with this, the transcendental power of judgment devises the conditions for the actual application and subsumes on the basis of that the manifold things in the sensibility under the pure concepts of the understanding. Thus the determining judgment is brought forth. In contrast to this, in the reflective judgment the power of judgment must assume the universal, under which to subsume the particular. In other words, it must provide the principle for itself. So the reflective judgment is that through which the power of judgment proves itself as an *a priori* legislative faculty with its autonomous principles.

The reflective judgment should have its peculiar necessity and validity, insofar as it is acknowledged to be a kind of judgment. This necessity and validity must be explicaded. It is certain that Kant already “exhausted all possible replies” to the question: ‘What can I know?’ as far as the determining judgment is concerned. But now he must supplement his replies by explicating the principles of the reflective judgment. In some sense, he must try again to answer the series of questions from the beginning. He mentions two types of the reflective judgment: the aesthetic judgment (including the judgment of taste) and the teleological judgment. The predicates of the aesthetic judgment are ‘beautiful’ and ‘sublime’. When we declare something (a work of nature or art) to be ‘beautiful’ or ‘sublime’, we do not presuppose any underlying concept of the understanding or reason. Still, “we allow no one to be of a different opinion”. In other words, we suppose the necessity and universal validity of this judgment without grounding it on any concepts. The predicate of the teleological judgment is ‘purposive’. Although everything in the world is determined through the causality of mechanism and there is no room left for teleology as a principle of the determining judgment, we still find in organisms the purposiveness of the parts pertaining to the whole as the end. We also suppose the necessity and universal validity of this kind of judgment. Both in the aesthetic and the teleological judgment we feel pleasure, as far as our power of judgment can subsume the particular under the assumed universal. In the contrary case we feel displeasure. Therefore Kant describes the power of judgment as the ‘faculty of pleasure and displeasure’.

2. The final end of creation

Kant explicates the generation of the aesthetic judgment, which contains the judgment of ‘the beautiful’
and that of the ‘sublime’, in the first part, and that of the teleological judgment in the second part of Critique of the Power of Judgment. Here I try to abstract his explications.

First, the judgment of ‘the beautiful’ presupposes the manifold things of the intuition and their free combination and arrangement by the imagination. When the manifold things are given, the imagination combines them. If the understanding forces its concept under which they should be subsumed, the activity of the imagination can be performed only in accordance with it. Then the determining judgment is produced. But the imagination can also freely combine the manifold things as far as the understanding does not designate any determinate concept. If the form, designed in such a free way, is fortuitously accordant with the uniting function of the understanding, there appears the harmony without the conception or the free lawfulness. Rousing the feeling of the pleasure, the power of judgment acts on autonomy and predicates the object to be ‘beautiful’. Insofar as this judgment is not predicated on the concept, it is not of objective, but only of subjective validity. Still, it can pretend to the necessity of the universal assent, because we can presume that the a prior disposition of the faculties of our mind is common to all human beings and can admit the feeling of the pleasure to be universal.

Secondly, as to the predicate ‘sublime’, Kant gives the following clear-cut definition:

“That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses.”

And he mentions two types of the object which the power of judgment predicates to be sublime: the mathematically sublime and the dynamically sublime. Mathematically sublime is ‘that which is absolutely great’, or that ‘in comparison with which everything else is small’. So the infinite magnitude is meant by that. However, in mathematics we treat the magnitude conceptually as means of the determining judgment. Only when we merely reflect on the representation of an object and regard it as promoting our estimation of magnitude, we judge the object sublime. Namely “in that case we always combine a kind of respect with the representation, just as we combine contempt with that which we call absolutely small”.

Dynamically sublime is Nature, insofar as it is considered as a power which means ‘a capacity that is superior to great obstacles’, only on condition that it ‘has no dominion over us’.

Thus in the judgment of the sublime, both mathematically and dynamically, the capacity of the imagination to apprehend the manifold things in sensibility does not perform well. While in the judgment of the beautiful the arrangement of the manifold things of the sensibility, freely designed by
the imagination, fortuitously accords with the uniting function of the understanding, in the judgment of
the sublime the activity of the imagination cannot fulfill itself, but is decisively obstructed. Therefore,
the feeling of displeasure rises at first, especially in the case of the dynamically sublime. Nevertheless,
it is immediately transformed into the feeling of pleasure, because just this obstruction makes us think of
the higher unity of reason, the idea, which surpasses the unity of the understanding as well as the
apprehension of the imagination. Kant states as follows:

“One can describe the sublime thus: it is an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the
mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas.”

We can say that in the judgment of the sublime the power of judgment acts as an intermediary between
the imagination and reason skipping over the understanding, while in the judgment of the beautiful it
harmonizes the apprehension of the imagination with the uniting function of the understanding. In
other words, the power of judgment mediates between the imagination and the understanding in the
judgment of the beautiful and between the imagination and reason in the judgment of the sublime.

Then, as I stated above, Kant treats in the second part of *Critique of the Power of Judgment* of teleology
as the causality in which things of nature serve one another as means to ends. He argues mainly on
behalf of the validity of the teleological judgment in the cognition of the organism. The organism
means the object of nature within which the parts are arranged for the purpose of the maintenance of the
whole, so that they form a harmonious unity. Each part acts, as if it every time presupposes the whole as
the effect of its act. So it is judged as purposive. The organism forms a systematic whole not only as an
individual in respect of the arrangement of its parts, but also as a genus in respect of the subordination of
all the individuals under itself. In this sense the organism is called the natural end. Certainly, Kant is
convinced of the thoroughgoing validity of the causality of mechanism. So he can admit no other
determining judgment than that sort even in the cognition of the organism. However, he states that in
consideration of the properties of the organic nature the human cognitive faculty can be also directed
effectively by the teleological view in search of the further cognitions. Thus teleology is useful as ‘the
heuristic and regulative principle’ in the cognition of the organism. We can recognize that this
acknowledgement constitutes the main part of the addition that Kant made to his answer to the first
question: ‘What can I know?’ in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

Just as the power of judgment in the aesthetic judgment presupposes the manifold of the sensibility and
connects it with the indeterminate unity of the understanding (in the judgment of the beautiful) or reason
(in the judgment of the sublime), it presupposes in the teleological judgment of the organism the
representation of the manifold parts, which are received through the sensible intuition, and connects it with the unity of the whole. It acts also in this case as an intermediary between the imagination and the understanding. However, Kant regards teleology as having a more far-reaching function than the cognition of the organism. In fact, he speaks in the introduction of ‘the formal purposiveness of nature’ as ‘a transcendental principle of the power of judgment’. The formal purposiveness of nature means that the manifold empirical cognitions of nature as well as the special laws that the understanding makes of them are fit for forming a systematic whole through the thoroughgoing interconnection with each other. Namely, our faculty of mind is disposed to connect the empirical cognitions with each other into a systematic whole and must use the formal purposiveness of nature as the heuristic principle in the progress of our cognition of nature. In other words, a scheme for the systematic unity of all the cognitions is mapped out a priori in our mind. Although in Critique of Pure Reason Kant already explained it as the regulative principle of reason or the ‘regulative use of the ideas of pure reason’, he describes it now as the principle of the power of judgment. So he mentions here as the maxims of the reflective power of judgment the following:

“Nature takes the shortest way” (lex parsimoniae); “It takes no leaps, either in the sequence of its changes or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms” (lex continui in natura); “the great multiplicity of its empirical laws is nevertheless unity under a few principles” (principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda); and so on.

Thus, according to Kant, teleology is founded on the formal purposiveness as the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. The teleological judgment in the cognition of the organism is nothing other than the materialization of that. We can say that the fitness of the parts of the organism for a whole can be called ‘the material purposiveness’, and the individual organism as well as the organism as a genus ‘the natural end’. Here the faculty of our mind finds its disposition fulfilled although in a limited area. This is the second stage of the development of teleology. Moreover, encouraged by this success in the cognition of the organism, the faculty of our mind becomes of necessity aware of itself. Then it pursues its intention of molding the real world into a systematic whole after the model of the organism. Here we can justly speak of ‘the self-aware purposiveness’ as the third stage, although Kant himself does not use such a term. I agree with Tanabe Hajime on that point.

With the self-aware purposiveness as its own principle, the power of judgment acts now as a worldview-builder. It systematizes the world through the thoroughgoing interconnection of the means
and the end into a teleological whole. At the top of the system should stand the being with the highest value in this world: the human being under moral laws. So Kant characterized it as ‘the final end of creation’. But we must interpret ‘the human being’ not as an individual, but as a collective concept. Namely, we should remodel the world in order that all the things should be properly subordinated to the moral purpose of humankind. This activity creates culture out of nature. Only in accordance with that our power of judgment can perform its self-aware worldview-building.

3. The moral proof of the existence of God

The proof of the existence of God associated with teleology of nature is called ‘the physicotheological proof’. In this proof one infers from the order or the purposive arrangement that is to be observed in nature the existence of the cause proportioned to it. But Kant refuted the proof in Critique of Pure Reason. He argued that the proof can at most establish a wise architect of the world, but not a creator of it. “Thus physico-theology cannot give any determinate concept of the supreme cause of the world, and hence it cannot be sufficient for a principle of theology, which is supposed to constitute in turn the foundation of religion.” Although he confirms now the validity of the teleological judgment in the cognition of the organism, he has no intention of rehabilitating the physicotheological proof. On the contrary, his explication makes it evident that physicotheology as the attempt of reason to infer from the ends of nature, that is, the organisms, the supreme cause of nature and its properties can include nothing more than the teleology of nature. So he asserts that physicotheology is nothing but a misunderstood physical teleology.

However, he explicates teleology now in its whole aspect. As we saw in the preceding chapter, it is recognized that teleology in its full development constructs a systematic worldview on the top of which humankind stands as the final end of creation. It is of logical necessity for us to infer from this the existence of the creator itself and its properties. So we must speak of another form of the proof of the existence of God based on the teleological observation of the world. Since the human being can qualify itself as the final end of creation only under moral laws, this proof is a practical one and is properly called ‘the moral proof of the existence of God’. God, whose existence is to be proved now, is the creator of the moral world, rules the world under the moral laws and keeps it in the moral order. Theology, as is founded on this proof, is called ‘ethicotheology’. As I have tried to clarify it, Kant supplements in Critique of the Power of Judgment his answer to the
first question: ‘What can I know?’ with his theory of the reflective judgment. Certainly, he is not obliged by that to revise also his answer to the second question: ‘What should I do?’ insofar as this question is exclusively practical and therefore substantially independent of the first. But his answer to the third question: ‘What may I hope, if I do what I should?’, which is “simultaneously practical and theoretical”, needs revision and correction. Now that Kant admits that we can know more than he supposed in *Critique of Pure Reason*, as a consequence his argument about the answer to the third question must be also reinforced. We human beings can surely entertain on the basis of our broadened knowledge more improved hopes than Kant described in *Critique of Practical Reason*. The term ‘moral proof of the existence of God’ as well as ‘ethicotheology’ indicates above all this improvement. Certainly, he admitted already in *Critique of Practical Reason* the existence of God besides the immortality of the soul to be an object of our hope. But he explained it just as the postulate of practical reason. A postulate means: ‘*theoretical* proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an *a priori* unconditionally valid *practical law*’. So Kant could not demonstrate there the existence of God. And yet, he speaks now of ‘the moral proof’ of it. We can recognize that as an effect of teleology on religion.

However, we cannot be content with this formal explanation of the improvement. What is important for us is to confirm the substantial enrichment in what Kant now states about his solution of the question: ‘What may I hope’. Namely, he asserts that we as moral human beings may hope that (1) God as the moral creator of the world exists, (2) God as the legislator of the moral law rules the world and that (3) God keeps the moral order of the world, which includes God’s acts as those of the distributor of the happiness in accordance with each person’s moral worthiness. And an important corollary must be drawn from here: the hope for the establishment of a moral community of the whole humankind. Human beings live under the dominion and the protection of God as the moral creator; that means that they form a community in which they constantly improve each other in their interaction. As Albert Schweitzer already pointed out, Kant’s characterization of human being as the final end of creation has nothing to do with a solipsistic standpoint. Kant means clearly humankind as the crown of creatures. So the formation of a moral community of the whole humankind through which they can meet the requirement of their creator is necessarily included in what humankind may hope.

In thus referring to humanity as a whole, Kant’s answer to the third question here admittedly surpasses the answer which he gave in *Critique of Practical Reason*. In that work he mentioned as the subject matters of the postulates the immortality of one’s soul and the existence of God who was characterized...
merely as the distributor of the happiness to the individuals. Thus his argument was confined in an individualistic perspective. Now that he speaks of a moral community of humankind, his thinking is regarded as having attained a new stage. But he does not sufficiently develop his argument about this subject in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. He has yet to explicate the details of the idea of a moral community of humankind. Of course, Kant himself is aware of that. Therefore, three years later he writes to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, in the letter attached to the complimentary copy of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*, the explication that with the enclosed work he has tried to complete the third part of his plan. This proclaims that it was not until the publication of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* that Kant became convinced to have given a complete answer to the third question.

In order to elaborate on the idea of the moral community of humankind, Kant’s argument should make headway in the orderly sequence as follows: (1) the confirmation of the human being’s ability to comply with the moral law, although the propensity to evil indwells in human nature. (2) the manifestation of the example of a perfectly moral person after which human beings can expect to overcome the evil, (3) the foundation of a moral community as a people of God under the moral laws by the human beings imitating the example, (4) the warning against the degradation of the well founded community. If we look into the four parts that constitute *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*, we can recognize that the contents of this book precisely meet the requirements of the development of Kant’s philosophical thinking. Since the last part can be regarded as additional, we can admit that the third part makes the climax of the development. That is also Albert Schweitzer’s opinion.

I am much obliged to Mr. Jean-Pierre Antonio, my respected colleague, for his kindness to correct my manuscripts.

---

**Notes**

2) *Correspondence*, pp 458-459.
3) Or the title is translated as: *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*.
5) ibid., pp 66-67.
6) ibid., p134.
7) ibid., p133.
ibid., p143. And the following passage is probably the most impressive: “Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.”(pp 144-5) We must concede that his statement sounds somewhat unsympathetic, especially when we think of the many victims of hurricanes etc. However, we can admit that it is his real intention to base our feeling of sublimity upon the awe-inspiring powerfulness of nature.

ibid., p151.


Critique of the Power of Judgment, p69.


§84. On the final end of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself: Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp 301-303.


Critique of Practical Reason: Practical Philosophy, p238.

cf. Albert Schweitzer, Die Religionsphilosophie Kants, first published in Germany, 1899.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:


___________, Correspondence, translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1999.
Secondary Sources:


__________, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion within His Plan for a System of Philosophy, in: *Proceeding of the 10th International Kant-Congress at the University of São Paulo*, 2005.

