

Immanuel Kant's Theory of Religion Based on the Ethicotheological Worldview

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Abstract

Immanuel Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* (1793) is the work, in which the author explicates most comprehensively his philosophy of religion. As Kant explains in one of his letters, he tried with this work to complete the third part of his planned philosophy. Accordingly we should appreciate the importance of this work for what is called his critical philosophy. In spite of that, many scholars, taking Kant's own explanation with a grain of salt, would not treat this work as an equal with the three precedent *Critiques*. They point out that the work, not attaining the same methodical exactitude as the three critiques, does not represent systematically Kant's complete philosophy of religion. Hereby they remind us of the background that the four parts of the book *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* were originally planned as contributions to a popular monthly review, and that the book lacks integration, since it is virtually a mixture of four single articles. In my opinion their underestimation of it is caused by their ignorance of the whole basis that *Critique of the Power of judgment* gave for Kant's theory of religion. In this paper I argue that the whole theory of religion explicated in *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* is based on the ethicotheological worldview as a result of *Critique of the Power of judgment*. The ethicotheological worldview opened up a vista for the solution of the question: "What may I hope?" In the last parts of *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant outlined a series of hopes, of which the elaboration he left to the succeeding work. Since the whole theme of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* was thus prescribed, the book should be regarded as integrated in its entirety. From this perspective I explicate successively the purport of each part of the book.

Keywords: predisposition, propensity, religion, humankind, community

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Preface

Immanuel Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* (1793) is the work, in which the author explicates most comprehensively his philosophy of religion. Kant himself claims the importance of the work in one of his letters as follows:

...The plan I prescribed for myself a long time ago calls for an examination of the field of pure philosophy with a view to solving three problems: (1) What can I know? (metaphysics). (2) What ought I to do? (moral philosophy). (3) What may I hope? (philosophy of religion). A fourth question ought to follow, finally: What is man (anthropology, a subject on which I have lectured for over twenty years). With the enclosed work, *Religion within the Limits [of Reason Alone]*¹⁾, I have tried to complete the third part of my plan. [...]

To Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, May 4, 1793.²⁾

Accordingly we should recognize the work as representing the third stage of what is called Kant's critical philosophy, where he gives a complete answer to the question "what may I hope?" and prepares for the final stage of it, i.e. the solution of the question "what is man?" Yet, not a few scholars would take this proclamation of Kant with a grain of salt, looking upon it as his self-recommendation in the covering letter of the presentation copy to his friend. They would not treat *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* as an equal with the three precedent *Critiques* on the grounds that it does not attain the same methodical exactitude as these, and moreover, it does not represent systematically Kant's complete philosophy of religion. Hereby they remind us of the background that the four parts of the book *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* were originally planned as contributions to a popular monthly review, and that the book, to which the title was only afterwards given, lacks integration, since it is virtually a mixture of four single articles. But in my opinion they are unjust to the book *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*. Their underestimation of that work is caused by their ignorance of the whole basis that *Critique of the Power of judgment* gave for Kant's theory of religion. I mean by that the ethicotheological worldview.

1. The ethicotheological worldview as the basis for the theory of religion

We know that *Critique of the Power of Judgment* opened up as a result of the teleological observation of nature, a vista for a systematic worldview on the top of which humankind stands. Humankind as moral entity can subordinate all the other ends of nature to itself and utilize them as means to the full development of its morality. Therefore humankind under moral laws is characterized as the final end of creation. It is then of logical necessity that a new form of the proof of God's existence appears that infers from the existence of the final end of creation, that is to say, of the crown of the creatures, that of the Creator itself. God, whose existence should thus be proved, is the Creator of the moral world, rules the world under moral laws and keeps it in the moral order. So the proof is properly called the moral proof of the existence of God. Theology, insofar as is founded on it, is called ethicotheology. So the ethicotheological worldview means the whole teleological system of the world under the rule of Creator-God.

The validity of the moral proof of the existence of God is not merely speculative, since it is conditioned by the human moral practice. But at the same time it is characterized also as a theoretical cognition insofar as it demonstrates the existence of God. In other words, it concerns the third question of Kant's philosophy: "What may I hope?" which is simultaneously theoretical and practical. According to the proof, we may hope that (1) God as the moral creator of the world exists, (2) God as the legislator of the moral law rules the world and that (3) God keeps the moral order of the world, which includes God's acts as those of the distributor of the happiness in accordance with each person's moral worthiness. And the hope for the establishment of a moral community of the whole humankind must be drawn as an important corollary, because the dominion and the protection of God as the moral creator means that human beings form a community in which they constantly improve each other in their interaction.

However, in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant could only outline this series of hopes. He could not yet develop his argument about the idea of a moral community of humankind. Its elaboration had to be left to the succeeding work. Thus the whole theme of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* was prescribed. Therefore we can regard the book as integrated in its entirety in spite of the circumstances that each part of it was written separately as a contribution to the monthly review. From this viewpoint we can describe the subject matters of all the parts of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* as successively connected in the following way:

Part 1: Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle alongside the good, or, Of radical evil in human nature. Its subject matter is: the confirmation of the human being's ability to accept the moral law, although the propensity to evil is deep-rooted in the human disposition.

Part 2: Concerning the struggle of the good with the evil principle for dominion over the human being. Its subject matter is: the manifestation of the idea of a perfect moral person as the example after which human beings can expect to overcome evil.

Part 3: Concerning the victory of the good over the evil principle and the founding of a Kingdom of God on earth. Its subject matter is: the victory of the good principle attained by humankind imitating the example through the foundation of a moral community as a people of God under the moral laws.

Part 4: Concerning service and counterfeit service under the dominion of the good principle, or, Of Religion and Priestcraft. Its subject matter is: the warning against the degradation of the well founded community. It should be regarded as additional to the subject matter of the previous part.

Thus we can recognize that the whole contents of this book precisely meet the requirements of the development of Kant's philosophy and take literally his own above mentioned statement about the newly-published book in his letter to Stäudlin.

2. The confirmation of the human being's ability to accept the moral law –Part 1 of the book.

In the first part of the book Kant explicates human freedom as the property of the power of choice (Willkür). The power of choice means the ability of discretion in taking particular motives into the maxim for action. Among the motives from which to choose is the moral law. If one chooses the moral law as sufficient for constituting the maxim, one's act is morally good. Otherwise it is evil, even if it is outwardly legitimate. Human freedom is the parting of good and evil. However, according to Kant's observation, the inclination toward evil, that is, toward the neglect of the moral law, clings to human being's power of choice. Kant names this the propensity to evil or radical evil in human nature. More than half of his argument in this part is devoted to the serious obstacle to the morality because of this propensity to evil.

Therefore, not a few scholars are of the opinion that Kant corrected there his limited concept of human freedom in *Critique of practical Reason* (1788). In that work he explicated human freedom as that of the autonomous will. Practical reason gives the moral law as the unconditional principle. The autonomy of the will means that the human will accepts the moral law as its own legislation and determines itself to act. Thus human freedom is the property of the will that acts in compliance with the moral law. As far as one's act is free, one spontaneously does good, and vice versa. How should evil be explained, then? If one's act is caused by other motives than the moral law, one does evil. But

the act is not free, because in the motivation freedom of the will is obstructed. There would be no evil from freedom. Anybody, including Kant himself, would become aware of the absurdity of such argument, so that, as the scholars say, Kant had to propose again the concept of human freedom. This time, according to them, he explained it as the property of the power of choice and succeeded in correcting his previous fault.

Admittedly, their opinion is to a certain extent justifiable. Kant's argument there was no doubt effective in correcting his limited concept of freedom. But the immediate motivation to it should be sought in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, as I stated above. In that work Kant characterized humankind under the moral law, that is, insofar as it is the moral entity, as the final end of creation. Therefore the good principle certainly indwells human nature. In other words, all human beings are without exception aware of the motivation by the moral law. Yet experience teaches us that human beings are too often apt to neglect the moral law, to choose other motives and to do evil. In order to ensure the concept of the final end of creation, this difficult problem must be solved. Thus the confirmation, or more precisely the reconfirmation, of human being's ability to accept the moral law as the sufficient motive for act is aimed at by Kant's argument.

As is indicative of his aim, Kant describes previous to arguing about the radical evil the good principle as the predisposition to personality. By that he means the "susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice". Predisposition can be regarded as indwelling human nature in a strict sense of the word. It is the innate, intrinsic characteristic of humankind to be aware of the sufficient motivation to act by the moral law with the feeling of respect for it. This characteristic can never be erased from the human disposition. In contrast to this, propensity means an acquired habit and is imputable to the individual, although it is deep-rooted in the human disposition and seems to be innate in human nature. It is not quite impossible for a human being to get rid of the radical evil as the propensity, however difficult it may be. What is the most important to us, Kant treats the good and evil principles in human nature not as equals. It is impossible for the radical evil as propensity to banish the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as predisposition and to supersede it. In this sense the outcome of the contest is in advance already plain.

Yet, for all that we can never doubt Kant's sincerity in his argument, as if he would deceive us with a rigged match. On the contrary he explicates to the best of his ability the serious obstacles to the morality in the human disposition, as his observation of human beings requires it. Kant calls the impediment of the human disposition caused by the propensity the evil heart, of which he names three

grades: 1. frailty, 2. impurity and 3. depravity. The third is the most serious. Depravity, also called corruption, means that the human being subordinates the incentive of the moral law to other immoral incentives and constitutes his/her maxim in a morally reverse way. It can therefore also be described as perversity. The discretion to reverse the order of incentives thus dwells fundamentally within the human power of choice. As Kant himself describes it, it should be regarded as deliberate guilt (*dolus*) in contrast to the other two above mentioned grades as unintentional guilt (*culpa*). Insofar as the human choice is infected with it, the human act could never occur on the basis of the moral law, although it might be by chance outwardly consistent with this. The presupposition of Kant's moral philosophy threatens to be denied by that. Some scholars esteem that Kant paraphrases here virtually the Christian dogma of the original sin, from which the human being can be saved only by the divine grace. According to them, Kant is therefore frustrated in his moral philosophy of practical reason, although he would not admit it himself. But their opinion is false. As we repeatedly insist, Kant's argument is based upon the ethicotheological worldview. He presupposes the concept of the final end of creation. To intend a figure of speech with dogmatic terms, since Kant's conviction of the divine grace in the Creation for humankind is unshakable, he has no need to speak of the divine grace in the Salvation. Humankind should and can help themselves.

However, the persistence of the propensity does not permit Kant to propose an easy way to surmount it. Certainly, we almost come under the impression that his whole argument is pessimistically toned. He can only just assert that it is possible for us to overcome the propensity, although it is impossible to extirpate it:

Now if a propensity to this [inversion] does lie in human nature, then there is in the human being a natural propensity to evil; and this propensity itself is morally evil, since it must ultimately be sought in a free power of choice, and hence is imputable. This evil is *radical*, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims; as natural propensity, it is also not to be *extirpated* through human forces, for this could only happen through good maxims — something that cannot take place if the subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed to be corrupted. Yet it must equally be possible to *overcome* this evil, for it is found in the human being as acting freely.³⁾

The ultimate solution is represented with the slogan “the restoration to its power of the original predisposition to the good”, with which Kant also entitles the “general remark” appended to this part.

In the remark we find Kant's following statement which is probably the most important in showing the solution of the problem:

The restoration of the original predisposition to good in us is not therefore the acquisition of a *lost* incentive for the good, since we were never able to lose the incentive that consists in the respect for the moral law, and were we ever to lose it, we would also never be able to regain it. The restoration is therefore only the recovery of the *purity* of the law, as the supreme ground of all our maxims, according to which the law itself is to be incorporated into the power of choice, not merely bound to other incentives, nor indeed subordinated to them (to inclinations) as conditions, but rather in its full purity, as the *self-sufficient* incentive of that power.⁴⁾

Hence we know that Kant's assertion of the surmountability of evil is grounded on no theoretically persuasive demonstration. He only confesses anew his conviction that human nature is predisposed to good. The predisposition takes rank of the propensity. What we should do is to restore the former to its original power. The moral law orders us to be good, and we all are aware of that and susceptible to the respect for the moral law. Therefore we can be also good; "You can, because you ought to." There may be not a few people that cannot be satisfied with Kant's solution like this. But apart from that, we must admit that it was crucial for the completion of Kant's philosophy that he managed to reconfirm in that way the qualification of humankind for the final end of creation.

3. The manifestation of the idea of a perfect moral person as the example –Part 2 of the book.

Although the possibility of overcoming evil was declared with conviction, we must still regard the human disposition as the field of the fierce battle between good and evil. What is needed is the example after which human beings can expect to overcome evil. The personality with the disposition completely accordant with the moral law is an abstract concept of reason, or idea. When it manifests itself in a particular individual, it can serve as the example which all human beings should imitate. Such manifestation, named "the personified idea of the good principle", is the subject matter of the second part of the book. Kant briefly summarizes the life of that exemplary person as follows:

We cannot think the ideal of a humanity pleasing to God (hence of such moral perfection as is

possible to a being pertaining to this world and dependent on needs and inclinations) except in the idea of a human being willing not only to execute in person all human duties, and at the same time to spread goodness about him as far wide as possible through teaching and example, but also, though tempted by the greatest temptation, to take upon himself all sufferings, up to the most ignominious death, for the good of the world and even for his enemies.⁵⁾

Thus Kant marks the life with three kinds of deed; (1) the execution of all human duties or the practice of good, (2) the spread of good through teaching and setting examples and (3) withstanding even the greatest temptation until the most ignominious death. Concerning the last one we may well ask why the exemplary person must be subjected to such great sufferings. Kant answers as follows:

–For human beings cannot form for themselves any concept of the degree and the strength of a force like that of a moral disposition except by representing it surrounded by obstacles and yet –in the midst of the greatest possible temptations –victorious.⁶⁾

What Kant means is quite understandable. As far as the human disposition is really nothing but a battlefield between good and evil, the best way to convince human beings of the ultimate victory of good is to show them the example that the person with the best disposition endures the maximum of the attack of evil and at last wins. Needless to say, Kant alludes to the life of Jesus narrated in the Gospels, especially to his Passion. However he never mentions Jesus by name. All the mythological narratives are removed or ignored. The important title “the son of God” is interpreted as a metaphorical expression such as: “Surely he is the son of God.” Since the personality of the perfect morality or that with the completely good disposition is quite unusual with human beings, we cannot imagine how an individual could get rid of the propensity clinging to him/her and attain the highest purity. We cannot but suppose that the Divinity, that is, the idea of good, itself descended from Heaven and was incarnated in that person. According to Kant, it is therefore quite natural for us to call such person as Jesus the son of God. As for the Resurrection, Kant does not mention it, although the expression “withstanding even the greatest temptation until the most ignominious death and yet victorious” implies the revival in some figurative sense.

Considering the spirit of that age, the merit of Kant’s demythologized Christology, or we had better call it “Jesusology”, should be highly estimated. He shows by it that Christianity corresponds in essence to

the reasonable religion of morality. The latter is defined as the respectful recognition of all the moral laws as if they were the commands of God. In Christianity God is regarded as the moral ruler and the intermediating Saviour is in reality nothing but an example of the personality of perfect morality for the whole humankind. From here the consequence would be necessarily drawn; The Christian religion as such should be released from its local and historical limitations in the past. It can then permeate the whole world, so that it becomes the common property of humankind. Thus the spread of Christianity is approved and encouraged in the cause of universality.

Also from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy this part of the book is of great importance. At the time, when Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* was published, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was 23 years old and was in Bern, Switzerland, as tutor in a wealthy family. The book gave a great impression to him. He wrote about that to his younger friend Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Soon he wrote a brief article entitled "Leben Jesu (Life of Jesus)". It was not published during Hegel's lifetime like his other adolescent works. Afterwards, 1907, Herman Nohl compiled them and published them as: *Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften (Hegel's theological adolescent works)*. Among the contained articles "Leben Jesu" is especially worthy of our notice because of its Kantian tones. Hegel tries here to represent Jesus as a teacher of the highest morality. On the basis of Kant's argument in the second part of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason* Hegel interprets the whole life of Jesus depicted in Gospels (especially John's) as the destiny of the man who taught the pure morality in Judean society as a prefecture of Roman Empire. We can comment that Hegel went a step further and represented the life of the exemplary person against its historical background. Without doubt he stood at that time in his life most near to Kant, or more precisely, to the author of the second part of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*. Although he left Kant's roof with his further progress, the influence that Kantian philosophy had on the young Hegel was crucial for the construction of the latter's system of philosophy in later years as we know. Furthermore, after Hegel's death, David Friedrich Strauß, a prominent scholar of the Hegelian school, wrote also *Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus)*, 1835, although he did not read Hegel's manuscript of "Leben Jesu". The subject of the book was the historical Jesus demythologized from Gospels on the basis of Kantian Jesusology. The book caused the split of the school. Among the scholars that belong to the progressive left-wing faction, the left-Hegelians, was Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach, who declared that the secret of theology is anthropology, that is to say, the debunked Christianity is nothing but anthropology. We can justly regard him in so declaring as a disciple of Kant.

4. The foundation of a moral community as a people of God under the moral laws

–Part 3 of the book.

Through the contact with the example, that is to say, through the reading and hearing of Gospels, people feel encouraged and become convinced of the victory of good. They imitate the example and endeavour to improve in disposition so that they might master the complete morality. They hold communion with each other in promoting morality. Thus a moral community, which is open to all human beings that practice morality, is formed. We may suppose that the generation of such a community can be regarded at least to some extent as spontaneous. Yet Kant insists that it is our duty to endeavour to form and develop it.

Just as Thomas Hobbes distinguished from the political and juristic viewpoint the juridical state of nature and the politico-civil state, Kant distinguishes here from the ethical viewpoint the ethical state of nature and the ethico-civil state. In the ethical state of nature the propensity to evil, which clings to human nature, incessantly intimidates and attacks the human disposition. It would corrupt one's own as well as each other's predisposition to good. Even if each individual has good intention, the dominion of evil cannot be escaped because such state lacks a principle that unites human beings. Kant describes it as follows:

Just as the juridical state of nature is a state of war of every human being against every other, so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each human being, is incessantly attacked by the evil which is found in him and in every other as well. Human beings (as we remarked above) mutually corrupt one another's moral predisposition and, even with the good will of each individual, because of the lack of a principle which unites them, they deviate through their dissensions from the common goal of goodness, as though they were *instruments of evil*, and expose one another to the danger of falling once again under its dominion.⁷⁾

Therefore human beings in the ethical state of nature do harm to each other and would inevitably ruin themselves. In order to avoid such a consequence, they must leave this state as soon as possible and be integrated into a whole society under the law of virtue, named the ethico-civil state. Now the idea of a whole community of humankind under moral laws, or laws of virtue, as public laws is formed, accompanied by the human duty to complete it. This duty is regarded as imposed on humankind for its own sake:

Now, here we have a duty *sui generis*, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively –in the idea of reason –destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.] toward a system of well-disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power: so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in principle.⁸⁾

The expected effect, the completion of the whole community of humankind, surpasses human beings' power. The duty presupposes therefore a higher moral being, God, whose rule only enables human beings to entertain a hope for fulfilling it:

We can already anticipate that this duty will need the presupposition of another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect. [...] ⁹⁾

Now it is clear that this duty is properly performed by the people who receive the moral laws as the commands of God, recognize in the exemplary person the perfect morality and imitate it. They form and develop “a people of God under moral laws” and lead the history of humankind.

A people of God following the example of Jesus has already taken form in Christian ecclesiastical body named Church. But Kant speaks here primarily the ideal community of humankind. It is called the invisible church as “the mere idea of the union of all upright human beings under direct yet moral divine world-governance, as serves for the archetype of any such governance to be founded by human beings.”¹⁰⁾ The visible church is “the actual union of human beings into a whole that accords with this ideal.”¹¹⁾ Each visible church as a historical entity is inevitably localized and people's faith there, the ecclesiastical faith, is conditioned by the tradition peculiar to its locality. However, a visible church is called a true church, as far as it unceasingly intends to display the ideal community “inasmuch as this

can be realized through human beings”¹²⁾.

Hence we can appreciate Kant's view of the history of religion. There should be only one religion and one religious community in the world, that is, the religion of practical reason and the moral community of humankind. But there are many churches and ecclesiastical faiths. Each church as a true church should be aware of its own local limitations, get rid of them and proceed from its ecclesiastical faith toward the pure religious faith of practical reason. Even the exegesis of the sacred scriptures of each ecclesiastical faith can serve this process, insofar as it has for the supreme interpreter of this the pure religion of practical reason itself. The stages of the history of religion represent such gradual transition of the ecclesiastical faiths toward the pure religion. The end of the history of religion is in this sense the coming of the Kingdom of God.

But I must also mention the problematic bias that Kant's view of the history of religion has. Seemingly Kant ranges all the ecclesiastical faiths on the same level, as far as they form the true churches. Every true church should gradually replace its ecclesiastical faith with the moral religion of practical reason, and so should be integrated into the whole community of humankind. Kant seems to count among the ecclesiastical faiths mainly the faiths of the various Christian sects as well as of the local Churches. He mentions also Judaism, or Judaic faith, and Islamic faith which he calls Mohammedanism. Although he does not refer to the ecclesiastical faith of the Asian religions, we have no reason to doubt that he has a wide spectrum of the history of the world in his field of vision and imagines the world-wide process of the transition of religions, or more properly, of ecclesiastical faiths. But his view is based to the bitter end on Christian faith. The people of God follow the example of Jesus in Gospels. The coming Kingdom of God must be led by Jesus as the criteria of the membership! If a Christian sect succeeds in completely releasing its ecclesiastical faith from the local limitation of that, it will return to its pure religion, attain its own essence, and so be integrated into the Kingdom of God, aside from a much heretical sect. In contrast to that, a “church” of non-Christian religion, as far as it wants to be a “true church”, must not only remove the local limitation of its ecclesiastical faith, but replace this with Christian religion. It is not until it is recognized as following the example of Jesus that it is integrated into the whole community of humankind and these people belong to the Kingdom of God. In order to get the membership of the community of humankind, they must first become Christians, or precisely, followers of Jesus! Kant himself was convinced that he succeeded in demythologizing and universally humanizing Christianity, and so in getting a perspective for an impartial view of the history of religion. Therefore he does not seem to care at all how unfairly his theory weighs against non-Christian

“churches”. Yet we know about the movement of the modern world until the present day, in which the Western expansionism has had power over the whole world. We must therefore point out from our viewpoint that Kant's unconscious partiality for the tradition of his own world implies the most serious problem.

I am much obliged to Mr. Jean-Pierre Antonio, my respected colleague, for his kindness to correct my manuscripts.

Notes

- 1) Or the title of the book is translated as: *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*.
- 2) *Correspondence*, pp 458-459.
- 3) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in: *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge, 1996, p 83.
- 4) *ibid.* p 91.
- 5) *ibid.* p 104.
- 6) *ibid.* p 104.
- 7) *ibid.* p 132.
- 8) *ibid.* pp 132-133.
- 9) *ibid.* p 133.
- 10) *ibid.* p 135.
- 11) *ibid.* p 135.
- 12) *ibid.* p 135.

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